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On Improving Energy Efficiency within Green
Femtocell Networks: A Hierarchical Reinforcement
Learning Approach
Xianfu Chen, Honggang Zhang, Tao Chen, Mika Lasanen, and Jacques Palicot
Abstract—One of the efficient solutions of improving coverage
and increasing capacity in cellular networks is the deployment
of femtocells. As the cellular networks are becoming more
complex, energy consumption of whole network infrastructure
is becoming important in terms of both operational costs and
environmental impacts. This paper investigates energy efficiency
of two-tier femtocell networks through combining game theory
and stochastic learning. With the Stackelberg game formulation,
a hierarchical reinforcement learning framework is applied for
studying the joint expected utility maximization of macrocells
and femtocells subject to the minimum signal-to-interference-
plus-noise-ratio requirements. In the learning procedure, the
macrocells act as leaders and the femtocells are followers. At
each time step, the leaders commit to dynamic strategies based
on the best responses of the followers, while the followers
compete against each other with no further information but the
leaders’ transmission parameters. In this paper, we propose two
reinforcement learning based intelligent algorithms to schedule
each cell’s stochastic power levels. Numerical experiments are
presented to validate the investigations. The results show that
the two learning algorithms substantially improve the energy
efficiency of the femtocell networks.
Index Terms—Stackelberg game, resource allocation, energy
efficiency, femtocell, algorithm/protocol design and analysis, re-
inforcement learning.
I. INTRODUCTION
The insatiable desire for higher data rates and the re-
quirement of ubiquitous internet access require a more dense
deployment of base stations within the network cells. Whereas
the traditional network infrastructures are less efficient, but it
maybe not economical for the operators to make radical alter-
nation to the current network architectures. Cellular networks
are generally designed to provide large coverage and are not
efficient in satisfying the need of ever increasing capacity-
density. Therefore, cellular network deployment solutions
based on femtocells are quite promising under this context [1].
Due to the short transmit-receive distance property, femtocell
techniques can greatly improve the indoor experience of the
mobile users.
The escalation of energy consumption in wireless com-
munications directly leads to the growth of greenhouse gas
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emission, which has been recognized as a major threat for
environmental protection and sustainable development. Today,
the increasingly rigid environmental standards have created an
urgent need for green evolution in wireless communication
networks [2], [3]. In wireless cellular networks, the radio
access section is the main source of energy consumption,
accounting for up to more than 70% of the total energy
consumption.
To meet the challenges raised by the exponential growth
in mobile services and energy consumption, it’s crucial to
increase the energy efficiency in wireless cellular networks.
This paper addresses the energy efficiency problem in fem-
tocell networks. The problem of energy-efficient spectrum
sharing and power allocation in cognitive radio femtocells
was studied in [4], where a three-stage Stackelberg game
model was formulated to improve the energy efficiency. In
[5], Ashraf et al. proposed a novel energy saving procedure
for the femtocell base station (FBS) to decide when to switch
on/off. Hereinafter, we focus mainly on discussing the co-
channel operation of femtocells with closed access. This is
mainly due to the following reasons: 1) privacy concerns;
2) limited backhaul bandwidth; 3) no coordination between
the macrocells and femtocells on spectrum allocation; 4) high
requirements on mobile terminals.
On the other hand, in co-channel two-tier femtocell net-
works, the cross-tier/co-tier interference greatly restricts the
overall network performance. Thus the interference cance-
lation in two-tier femtocell networks has become an active
area of research. For the uplink transmission in two-tier
femtocell networks, Chandrasekhar and Andrews [6] proposed
a distributed utility-based signal-to-interference-plus-noise ra-
tio (SINR) adaptation algorithm to alleviate the cross-tier
interference at the macrocell from the co-channel femtocells.
A Stackelberg game was formulated to study the resource
allocation in two-tier femtocell networks, where the macrocell
base station (MBS) protects itself by pricing the interference
from femtocell users (FUs) [7]. In [8], Jo et al. developed
two interference mitigation strategies that adjust the maximum
transmission power of FUs to control the cross-tier interference
at a MBS. Regarding the downlink transmissions, Guruacharya
et al. modeled the power allocation problem as a Stackelberg
game to maximize the capacity of each station [9]. And a
macrocell beam subset selection strategy was used to reduce
the cross-tier interference in two-tier femtocell networks in
[10].
The unplanned deployment of femtocells results in unpre-
2dictable interference patterns. Therefore, the interference in
this scenario can not be handled by means of centralized
network scheduling, because the number and locations of
femtocells are unknown. For such networking environment, the
femtocells are most likely to be autonomous, which motivates
using the idea of reinforcement learning (RL) [11] for interfer-
ence management. A realtime multi-agent RL algorithm that
optimizes the network performance by managing the interfer-
ence in femtocell networks was investigated in [12]. Bennis
et al. [13] developed a distributed learning scheme based on
Q-learning to manage the femto-to-macrocell cross-tier inter-
ference in femtocell networks. Inspired by evolutionary game
theory and machine learning, Nazir et al. [14] proposed two
intelligent mechanisms for interference mitigation to support
the coexistence of macrocell and femtocells.
In this paper, we model the energy efficiency aspect of
power allocation problem in femtocell networks as a Stackel-
berg learning game, i.e., leader-follower learning process, with
the following characteristics: 1) the macrocells are considered
to be the leaders, whereas the femtocells are considered to be
the followers; 2) the leaders behave by knowing the response
of the femtocells to their own strategy decisions; 3) given
the leaders’ decisions, the followers compete with each other.
Learning is accomplished by directly interacting with the
surrounding environment and properly adjusting the strategies
according to the realizations of achieved performance. The
solution of such a learning game is the Stackelberg equilibrium
(SE). If no hierarchy1 exists during the learning procedure,
the Stackelberg learning game reduces to the non-cooperative
learning game, which is the scenario discussed in [17]. Energy
efficiency in wireless networks were studied using Stackelberg
games in [15], [16].
Compared to the previous works, the main contributions of
this paper are summarized as follows:
• Firstly, for the energy efficiency problem in the femtocell
networks, we propose a Stackelberg learning game for all
users to jointly learn the optimal transmission strategies.
• Secondly, we develop a reinforcement learning based hi-
erarchical power adaptation algorithm (RLHPA-I) where
the learning rule for FUs is based on each FU’s private
and incomplete information, and the MU behaves as the
role of leader and learns the optimal transmission con-
figuration by obtaining all FUs’ strategy information; the
trajectory of the learning dynamics is also investigated.
• Thirdly, in order to encourage the potential cooperation
among the FUs, a second reinforcement learning based
hierarchical power adaptation algorithm (RLHPA-II) is
further proposed, where the FUs’ learn the optimal trans-
mission strategies through conjectural beliefs over other
competing FUs’ stochastic behaviors; the convergence of
the learning procedure is proved theoretically.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next
section presents the energy efficiency problem in femtocell
networks and defines a Stackelberg game theoretic solution for
the users’ hierarchical behaviors. In Section III, a Stackelberg
1In this paper, the hierarchy means that the knowledge levels of the users
are asymmetric.
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Fig. 1. A typical femtocell network deployment (MBS: macrocell base
station; MU: macrocell user; FBS: femtocell base station; FU: femtocell user).
learning framework is proposed and the existence of SE is also
investigated. Two reinforcement learning based algorithms are
derived in Section IV and Section V. The numerical results are
included in Section VI, verifying the validity and efficiency of
the proposed algorithms. Finally, we present in Section VII a
conclusion of this paper.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we first present the Stackelberg game formu-
lation for the energy efficiency problem in femtocell networks.
After that, the Stackelberg equilibrium of the proposed game
is investigated.
A. Stackelberg Game Formulation
The femtocell network scenario we considered in this paper
is illustrated in Fig. 1, where there exist multiple femtocells
and macrocells. Each macrocell consisting of a MBS and
multiple macrocell users (MUs), is underlaid with several co-
channel FBSs. In each femtocell, there is one FBS providing
service to femtocell users (FUs). Here we assume the closed
independent policy [1], since private customers may prefer
that kind of policy because of privacy concerns and limited
backhaul bandwidth. Assuming identical distribution of femto-
cells in various neighboring macrocells, we focus our emphasis
on the case of one representative macrocell for simplification,
without loss of generality. Suppose N femtocells Bi(i ≥ 1)
operate within the coverage of a macrocell B0. Users of the
same macrocell/femtocell adopt time division multiple access
(TDMA) for data transmission, thus causing no interference
within the same macrocell and femtocell. In the following,
this paper mainly addresses the uplink transmissions for the
distributed femtocells and the underlaid macrocell sharing a
common spectrum band.
Let i ∈ N denote the scheduled user connected to its BS
Bi, where N = {0, 1, . . . , N} refers to the index set of the
MU and various FUs belonging to the same coexisting cellular
region. Designate the transmission power level of user i as
pi
(
pmini ≤ pi ≤ p
max
i
)
, the SINR γi of user i received at Bi
3is given by
γ∗i ≤ γi (pi,p−i) =
hi,ipi∑
j∈N\{i} hj,ipj + σ
2
, (1)
where γ∗i represents the minimum SINR requirement, σ2 is
the variance of background Additive White Gaussian Noise
(AWGN), {hj,i} is the set of channel gains from user j to Bi,
and p−i is a vector of power allocation for all users except user
i, i.e., p−i = (p0, . . . , pi−1, pi+1, . . . , pN). In order to protect
the MU’s transmissions, we propose that the macrocell sets
a power mask constraint for all femtocells [18], that is, the
transmission power level of user i ∈ N\{0} over the shared
spectrum is constrained by
pi ≤ pmask. (2)
A power mask prescribes the maximum transmission power
that the femtocells may use over the spectrum. From a practical
viewpoint, this is much easier for the operators to manipulate
for the scenarios where the number of active femtocells varies
in time and space.
In the system under investigation, each user i ∈ N is
selfish in the sense of its own energy efficiency, which can
be expressed as [4], [19]
ηi (pi,p−i) =
W log2 (1 + γi (pi,p−i))
pa + pi
, (3)
where W is the spectrum bandwidth, and pa denotes the
additional circuit power consumption of devices during trans-
missions (e.g., digital-to-analog converters, analog-to-digital
converter, synthesizer,etc [20]) and is independent from the
transmission power. Considering the QoS requirement in Eq.
(1), we define the utility function of user i formally as
ui (pi,p−i) =
{
ηi (pi,p−i) , if γi (pi,p−i) ≥ γ∗i ;
0, otherwise.
(4)
Eq. (4) demonstrates interactions among the users. Each user
i’s strategy is to choose the power level pi that maximizes its
utility,
max
pi∈Pi
ui (pi,p−i) , (5)
where Pi =
[
pmini , p¯
max
i
]
is the strategy profile of user i, with
p¯maxi = min (p
max
i , pmask). Particularly, P0 =
[
pmin0 , p
max
0
]
for the MU.
In order to improve the energy efficiency, we introduce
Stackelberg game [21] in the considered networking environ-
ment. Stackelberg game is a strategic game which consists of
a leader and several followers competing with each other on
some resources. Such a game formulation can be viewed as
an intermediate scheme between the totally centralized power
adaptation strategy and the non-cooperative strategy in [17].
In this paper, the MU representing the whole MUs’ coalition
is modeled as the leader, while the FUs as the followers.
Therefore, a distinct hierarchy exists among the users; and
the leader plays the game by knowing the reaction function of
the followers. The followers behave competitively, given the
actions of the leader.
B. Stackelberg Equilibrium Solution
Game theory studies the rational interactions among the
players. For the proposed Stackelberg game formulation, the
SE describes an optimal strategy for the MU if all FUs always
response by playing their Nash equilibrium (NE) strategies in
the smaller sub-game. In order to investigate the existence of
an SE, we first define p∗i to be the best response to p−i if
ui (p
∗
i ,p−i) ≥ ui (pi,p−i) , ∀pi ∈ Pi. (6)
User i’s best response to p−i is denoted by BRi(p−i), maxi-
mizing its utility function subject to the power constraints. Let
NE(p0) be the NE strategy of the FUs if the MU chooses to
play p0, i.e.
NE(p0) = p−0, if pi = BRi(p−i), ∀i ∈ N\{0}. (7)
Definition 1. The strategy profile (p∗0,NE(p∗0)) is an SE if
and only if
u0 (p
∗
0,NE(p∗0)) ≥ u0 (p0,NE(p0)) , ∀p0 ∈ P0. (8)
The following theorem establishes the existence of the SE.
Theorem 1. The SE always exists in our proposed Stack-
elberg game with the MU leading and the FUs following.
Proof : In the proposed game formulation, it is not difficult
to find that each FU i 6= 0 strictly compete with other
followers in a non-cooperative fashion, given the MU’s ac-
tion ∀p0 ∈ P0. Therefore, a smaller non-cooperative power
adaptation sub-game is formulated at the femtocell side G =〈
p0,N\{0}, {Pi}, {ui}
〉
. For a non-cooperative game, NE is
a set of strategies, such that no player can benefit by changing
its action unilaterally, assuming other players continue to use
their current strategies. From the results in [4], [22], there is
at least one NE in the sub-game, since for ∀i ∈ N\{0}
1) the strategy profile Pi is a non-empty, convex, and
compact subset of some Euclidean space Rn;
2) ui is continuous in (p1, . . . , pi−1, pi+1, . . . , pN ) and
quasi-concave in pi.
On the other hand, there is only one player at the macro-
cell side, and the best response strategy of the MU can be
straightforwardly obtained through solving problem (5). The
above statement is thus proved. 
We need to point out that in the Stackelberg game, the MU
regards itself as the only leader and performs the Stackelberg
strategy, and the FUs will act their best responses until reach
the equilibrium (p∗0,NE(p∗0)). As the FUs, who are designated
as the followers, are selfish, rational, and can not coordinate
with each other. And they are going to play their best response
strategies NE(p∗0). By knowing this, the MU who is designated
as the leader has to transmit with power level p∗0 to maximize
his utility function.
III. STACKELBERG LEARNING FRAMEWORK
In the Stackelberg learning game, each user in the network
behaves as an intelligent agent, whose objective is to maximize
its payoff. And the payoff is measured in utility function (e.g.,
Eq. (4)), which reflects the users’ satisfaction of executing the
strategy. The Stackelberg learning framework has two levels
of hierarchy: 1) the MU learns to maximize its utility by
4knowing the response strategies of all FUs for each possible
play; 2) given the strategy of the MU, the FUs play a non-
cooperative learning game among each other. The game is
played repeatedly to learn the optimal transmission strategies.
A strategy for user i ∈ N is defined to be a probability
vector πi = (πi(pi,1), . . . , πi(pi,mi)) ∈ Πi, where πi(pi,ji)
means the probability with which the user i chooses action
(transmission power) pi,ji ∈ Pi, and Πi is the strategy set
available to user i. Since each user can only choose a power
level from a finite discrete set, Pi is assumed to be a finite set
with dimension mi. Then the expected utility function Ui for
user i can then be expressed as follows
Ui (πi,pi−i) = E [ui|user j plays strategy πj , j ∈ N ]
=
∑
p∈P
ui (p)
∏
s∈N
πs (ps,js) , (9)
where pi−i = (π0, . . . , πi−1, πi+1, . . . , πN ) is a vector of
strategies for all other users, p = (p0,j0 , . . . , pN,jN ) is the
vector of actions chosen by all users, and P = ×i∈NPi is the
space of all action vectors. An action suggests a power level
performed by the user, and we use an action and a transmission
power level interchangeably in the following discussions.
In the same way, we may have the following definition of
SE in the proposed Stackelberg learning game.
Definition 2. For any stationary strategy2 of the MU,
π0 ∈ Π0, the best-response strategies of all FUs define an
NE strategy NE(π0), i.e. NE(π0) = pi∗−0, if
π∗i = arg max
pii∈Πi
Ui (πi,pi−i) , ∀i ∈ N\{0}. (10)
The MU’s optimal strategy is then
π∗0 = arg max
pi0∈Π0
U0 (π0,NE(π0)) . (11)
Together (π∗0 ,NE(π∗0)) constitute a stationary strategy of SE
for the Stackelberg learning formulation.
Theorem 2. For the proposed Stackelberg learning game,
there exist a MU’s stationary strategy and a FUs’ NE strategy
that form an SE.
Inspired by [23], we can prove Theorem 2 as follows.
Proof: If the MU follows a stationary strategy π0 ∈ Π0, then
the Stackelberg learning game is simplified to be a N -player
stochastic learning game for the FUs. It has been shown in
[21] that every finite strategic-form game has a mixed strategy
equilibrium. In other words, there always exists a stationary
NE(π0) that is best response for all the FUs in our formulation
of the stochastic power adaptation process. The rest of the
proof follows directly from the definition of SE, and is thus
omitted for brevity. 
Therefore, if we can construct an asymptotically (with
time t) stationary strategy {πti |i ∈ N} converging to the SE
(π∗0 ,NE(π∗0)), we will achieve the main goal of the Stackelberg
learning power adaptation game in this paper. In the rest of
this paper, we focus our emphasis on how to reach the optimal
communication configuration through reinforcement learning
approach.
2A strategy is said to be stationary, where πi = (πi(1), . . . , πi(mi)) is
not changing with time during the stochastic learning process.
IV. REINFORCEMENT LEARNING BASED HIERARCHICAL
POWER ADAPTATION-I (RLHPA-I)
A. Reinforcement Learning based Algorithm
During the Stackelberg learning process, the MU behaves
as the role of leader and knows the transmission strategy
information of all FUs. Users with learning ability learn
to maximize its individual expected utility function through
repeated interactions with the surrounding networking environ-
ment. Among many different implementations of above adap-
tation mechanism, in this paper, we consider reinforcement
learning, known as the so-called Q-learning [24], [25], where
the users’ strategies are parameterized through Q-functions
that characterize the relative expected utility of a particular
power level. In Q-learning, users try to find the optimal Q-
values in a recursive way. More specifically, let Qti (pi,ji)
denote the Q-value of user i’s corresponding power level pi,ji
at time t. Then, after performing the transmission power level
pi,ji according to its strategy πti at time slot t, the Q-value is
updated via the following rule
Qt+1i (pi,ji) =
(
1− αt
)
Qti (pi,ji) + α
tUi
(
pi,ji ,pi
t
−i
)
, (12)
where αt ∈ [0, 1) is the learning rate, pit−i = (πt0, . . . ,
πti−1, π
t
i+1, . . . , π
t
N ) is the vector of other users’ strategies at
time t, and
Ui
(
pi,ji ,pi
t
−i
)
=
∑
p
−i∈P−i
ui
(
pi,ji , p−i
) ∏
s∈N\{i}
πts (ps,js) .
(13)
Here p−i =
(
p0,j0 , . . . , pi−1,ji−1 , pi+1,ji+1 , . . . , pN,jN
)
is a
vector of actions chosen by all users except user i over the
action space P−i = ×s∈N\{i}Ps.
The tradeoff between exploration and exploitation is a
challenge issue in stochastic learning process. The goal of Ex-
ploration is to continually try new actions, while exploitation
aims to “capitalize” on already established actions. One key
feature of reinforcement learning is that it explicitly considers
the exploration/exploitation in an integrated way, such that
the users not only reinforce the actions they already know to
be good but also explore new ones. In general, one deals with
this problem through using a probabilistic method for choosing
actions, e.g., ǫ-greedy selection [26] is an effective approach
of balancing exploration and exploitation. One drawback,
however, is that it might lead to globally suboptimal solution.
Thus, we need to incorporate some way of exploring less-
optimal actions.
An alternative solution is to vary the action probabilities as
a graded function of the Q-values. The most common method
is to use a Boltzmann distribution, that is, the probability of
choosing transmission power level pi,ji at time t+ 1 is given
by
πti (pi,ji) =
exp (Qti (pi,ji) /τi)∑
p∈Pi
exp (Qti(p)/τi)
, (14)
where τi is a positive parameter called the temperature and
controls the exploration/exploitation tradeoff [11]. A high
temperature causes the action selection probabilities to be all
nearly equal, while a low temperature results in big difference
in selection probabilities for actions differ in their Q-values.
5From Eq. (12) and Eq. (13), we can see that every user
i’s updating rule depends on the strategies of other users.
The MU who has the role of leader, can learn the op-
timal strategy according to Eq. (12) and Eq. (14). How-
ever, as the follower, each FU i ∈ N\{0} can neither
know other competing FUs’ private strategy information
pi
t
−(0,i) =
(
πt1, . . . , π
t
i−1, π
t
i+1, . . . , π
t
N
)
nor the utility value
ui(pi,ji , p−i) before performing the action pi,ji . The only
information it has is the MU’s transmission parameters, i.e.,
the selected transmission power levels. Thus the updating rule
for FU i is transformed to
Qt+1i (pi,ji) =
(
1− αtf
)
Qti (pi,ji)
+ αtfUi
(
p0,j0 , pi,ji ,pi
t
−(0,i)
)
, (15)
where αtf ∈ [0, 1) is the learning rate for the FUs, and
Ui
(
p0,j0 , pi,ji ,pi
t
−(0,i)
)
=∑
p
−(0,i)∈P−(0,i)
ui
(
p0,j0 , pi,ji , p−(0,i)
) ∏
s∈N\{0,i}
πts (ps,js) ,
(16)
and p−(0,i) =
(
p1,j1 , . . . , pi−1,ji−1 , pi+1,ji+1 , . . . , pN,jN
)
is a
vector of actions chosen by all FUs except FU i over the action
space P−(0,i) = ×s∈N\{0,i}Ps.
On the other hand, each FU i ∈ N\{0} is able to
compute the attainable utility ui(pi,ji , p−i) with the feedback
information (Eq. (1)) from its intended receiver. Under the
Stackelberg learning framework, the MU behaves as the leader
and makes decisions first. It’s therefore assumed that the
MU makes decisions every T (> 1) time slots, which is also
defined as one episode. After each action is executed by the
MU, all FUs repeatedly play the non-cooperative learning
game during the episode. Suppose that the MU selects power
level p0,j0 according to its strategy πk0 in episode k, the
expected Ui
(
p0,j0 , pi,ji ,pi
t
−(0,i)
)
at time slot t = (k−1)T+te
(te = 1, . . . , T ) can be estimated using recursion in Eq. (17),
where pt−(0,i) =
(
pt1,j1 , . . . , p
t
i−1,ji−1
, pti+1,ji+1 , . . . , p
t
N,jN
)
is
the vector of actions chosen by all other FUs except FU i at
time slot t, and nk,te−1i (pi,ji) is the number of times when
FU i selects power level pi,ji until time te − 1 in episode k.
At any time slot te ∈ {1, . . . , T } in each episode k, each FU
i ∈ N\{0} is always supposed to know its own and the MU’s
actions. Substituting Eq. (17) into Eq. (15), the Q-learning
rule for FU i can then be rewritten as
Qte+1i (pi,ji) =
(
1− αtef
)
Qtei (pi,ji) + α
te
f U˜
te
i (p0,j0 , pi,ji) .
(18)
While the MU’s learning algorithm resembles the standard
single-agent Q-learning except for the fact that the expected
utility is the utility accrued over one episode (i.e., T time
slots), that is,
Qk+10 (p0,j0) =
(
1− αkl
)
Qk0 (p0,j0) + α
k
l U
k
0 (p0,j0) , (19)
where αkl ∈ [0, 1) is the learning rate for the MU, and
Uk0 (p0,j0) =
1
T
∑
te∈{1,...,T}
U0
(
p0,j0 ,pi
(k−1)T+te
−i
)
. (20)
Accordingly, the strategy updates in Eq. (14) for the MU
and the FUs are based on different time scales. Now we
present the first reinforcement learning based hierarchical
power adaptation algorithm for the Stackelberg learning game.
RLHPA-I
Initialization:
1) t = 1(such that k = 1), initialize Q-values Qti(pi,ji ) for
each user i ∈ N and each action pi,ji ∈ Pi.
Learning:
2) In episode k, the MU chooses action p0,j0 according
to πk0 and broadcasts this information to all FUs in the
network.
3) Set U˜ (k−1)Ti (p0,j0 , pi,ji) = 0 for each FU i ∈ N\{0}
and each action pi,ji ∈ Pi. For t = (k−1)T+1, . . . , kT ,
do.
(3.1) FU i selects an action pi,ji according to πti and sends
its relevant strategy information to the macrocell.
(3.2) All users measure their SINR γi with the feedback
information of the intended receiver. If γi ≥ γ∗i , then
ηi (p) can be achieved; otherwise, the receiver can not
receive correctly, thus obtains zero utility value.
(3.3) The MU calculates U0
(
p0,j0 ,pi
t
−0
)
according to Eq.
(13).
(3.4) All FUs update U˜ ti (p0,j0 , pi,ji) basing on Eq. (17).
(3.5) All FUs update Q-values Qt+1i (pi,ji) according to Eq.
(18).
(3.6) All FUs update the strategies πt+1i (pi,ji) according to
Eq. (14).
(3.7) Set t = t+ 1.
4) The MU calculates Uk0 (p0,j0) according to Eq. (20).
5) The MU updates Q-values Qk+10 (p0,j0) according to Eq.
(19).
6) The MU updates the strategies πk+10 (p0,j0) according
to Eq. (14).
7) k = k + 1.
End Learning
The parameter T decides the number of time slots that all
FUs play the game before the MU updates its transmission
strategy. Note that the updating rules of the MU and the FUs
happen at different time scales. The FUs’ Q-values are updated
in every time slot whereas for the MU, the update happens
only once in T slots.
B. Discussion of RLHPA-I
From the definition of SE, it is clear that the convergence
of RLHPA-I to an SE requires that the MU’s learning process
converges to the optimal strategy while the FUs’ stochastic
behaviors converge to the corresponding NE under this optimal
strategy. In this subsection, we discuss the conditions for such
a convergence.
As already discussed, in the Stackelberg learning game we
propose, the FUs behave as the followers in a smaller sub-
game given the transmission strategy of the MU. In other
6U˜ tei (p0,j0 , pi,ji) =

ui
(
p0,j0 , pi,ji , pt−(0,i)
)
− U˜ te−1i (p0,j0 , pi,ji)
nk,te−1i (pi,ji) + 1
+ U˜ te−1i
(
pk0,j0 , pi,ji
)
, if pi,ji = pti,ji ;
U˜ te−1i (p0,j0 , pi,ji) , otherwise.
(17)
words, for each strategy of the MU, the FUs have a multi-
agent reinforcement learning problem in which the goal is to
learn the NE of the game. In our algorithm RLHPA-I, however,
the FUs have independent learning processes that run simul-
taneously, with each one corresponding to each action of the
MU. We use identical single-agent learning schemes for these
processes and as already noted, the FUs maintain separate
and private Q-values for each of these process. Each of these
learning processes proceeds during T time slots whenever the
MU makes a decision according to its transmission strategy.
That means each FU is also equipped with a standard single-
agent reinforcement learning algorithm as the MU. Given that
sufficient number of trails of the power levels have been
executed, the FUs in our algorithm will converge to the NE
responding to the MU’s different transmission strategies.
The following Lemma by Szepesvari and Littman [27] es-
tablishes the convergence of a general single-agent Q-learning
process updated by a pseudo-contraction operator. Let Q be
the space of all Q-values.
Lemma. Assume that the learning rate αt in Eq. (21)
satisfies the sufficient conditions of Theorem in [24], and
the mapping Ht : Q → Q meets the following condition:
there exists a number 0 < β < 1 and a sequence xt ≥ 0
converging to zero with probability (w.p.) 1 as t → ∞, such
that ‖HtQt −HtQ∗‖ ≤ β ‖Qt −Q∗‖ + xt for all Qt ∈ Q
and Q∗ = E [HtQ∗], then the iteration defined by
Qt+1 =
(
1− αt
)
Qt + αt
(
HtQt
)
, (21)
converges to Q∗ w.p. 1.
Theorem 3. RLHPA-I will always discover an SE strategy.
Proof: We prove this by contradiction. Suppose that the
process generated by Eq. (14) converges to a non-Stackelberg
equilibrium. From previous discussion, we know that the long
term behavior of RLHPA-I converges to stationary points. This
means that stationary points that are not SEs are stable, which
contradicting Theorem 2. 
Note that, unlike in the conventional single-agent rein-
forcement learning, in the considered Stackelberg learning
problem, the MU’s payoff value for performing a particular
action is dependent on the outcome of a sub-game, which
is played by the non-cooperative FUs in response to the
MU’s decision. When the FUs are in the process of learning
their own transmission strategies, the outcomes of the smaller
sub-games, and consequently, the utility values achieved by
the MU, can typically be non-stationary. With non-stationary
payoffs, the Lemma may not apply. In order to tackle this, we
adopt an averaging procedure in our algorithm, as indicated by
Eq. (20). At each updating step, the MU uses Uk0 (p0,j0), the
averaged expected utilities from T non-cooperative learning
games of the FUs. This provides the MU with utilities that
are good approximations of the payoffs corresponding to the
outcomes of the non-cooperative sub-game.
V. REINFORCEMENT LEARNING BASED HIERARCHICAL
POWER ADAPTATION-II (RLHPA-II)
In order to promote potential cooperation among the com-
peting FUs, we further propose a simple and intuitive rule
that each FU links its own current transmission strategy to the
other FUs’ strategies. Such a rule reflects an awareness that
there are strategic interactions during the learning procedure.
FUs with such beliefs may not correctly perceive how the
future strategies of their competitors depend on the past. In
this section, we propose a conjecture model concerning the
way in which the FUs react to each other.
A. Conjecture Model
Each FU i ∈ N\{0} thinks any change in its current
transmission strategy will induce other competing FUs to
make well-defined changes in the corresponding time slot.
Specifically, we need to estimate FU i’s expected contention
measure at time slot t = (k − 1)T + te, i.e., bti
(
p−(0,i)
)
=∏
s∈N\{0,i} π
t
s(ps,js) in Eq. (16), through a conjectural belief
b˜ti
(
p−(0,i)
)
, which is expressed as
b˜ti
(
p−(0,i)
)
= bi
(
p−(0,i)
)
−δi
(
πti(pi,ji)− πi(pi,ji)
)
, (22)
where the so-called reference points [28], bi
(
p−(0,i)
)
and
πi(pi,ji), are specific belief and probability, and δi > 0 is
the belief factor. The reference points are considered as exoge-
nously given. In other words, every FU i believes that a change
of πti(pi,ji)−πi(pi,ji ) in its own strategy at time t will induce a
change of δi (πti(pi,ji)− πi(pi,ji)) in the expected contention
measure correspondingly related to the transmission strategies
of other FUs. It’s necessary to point out here that although FU
i may be aware that other FUs are subject to many influences
on their strategies, when making its own decision, it is only
concerned with other FUs’ reactions to itself. That means FU i
does not take into account whether or not FU s (s ∈ N\{0, i})
might react to changes in transmission strategy made by FU
v(v ∈ N\{0, i, s}).
Among different possibilities of capturing the expected
contention measure bti
(
p−(0,i)
)
, the linear model represented
in Eq. (22) is the simplest form based on which one FU can
model the impact of its changes in transmission strategy to the
other competing FUs. In the non-cooperative learning process,
as intelligent agents, the FUs learn when they modify the
beliefs based on the new achievements. More specifically, we
allow the FUs to revise their reference points according to their
previous observations. That is, each FU i sets bi
(
p−(0,i)
)
and
7πi(pi,ji) to be bt−1i
(
p−(0,i)
)
and πt−1i (pi,ji). Eq. (22) then
becomes
b˜ti
(
p−(0,i)
)
= bt−1i
(
p−(0,i)
)
− δi
(
πti(pi,ji)− π
t−1
i (pi,ji )
)
.
(23)
The conjecture model deployed by the FUs are based on the
concept of reciprocity, which refers to the interaction mecha-
nisms in which the FUs repeatedly interact when choosing the
power level. If they realize that their probabilities of interacting
with each other in the future is high, they will consider their
influence on the strategies of other FUs, which is captured in
the conjecture model by the positive parameter δi. Otherwise,
they will act myopically, which is the same learning process
as in previous Section IV.
B. Conjecture based Reinforcement Learning Scheme
Following the previous analysis, the Q-learning rule for FU
i given by Eq. (15) is thus modified as Eq. (24). Therefore, we
propose the second reinforcement learning based hierarchical
power adaptation algorithm RLHPA-II to discover the SE
strategy. We may notice that the RLHPA-II is quite similar
to the RLHPA-I except that the FUs update their Q-values
based on Eq. (17) in RLHPA-I.
The detailed description of RLHPA-II is given as follows.
RLHPA-II
Initialization:
1) t = 1(such that k = 1), initialize Q-values Qti(pi,ji) for
each user i ∈ N and each action pi,ji ∈ Pi, and belief
factors δi for each FU i ∈ N .
Learning:
2) In episode k, the MU chooses action p0,j0 according to
πk0 , and the MBS broadcasts this information to all FUs
in the network.
3) For t = (k − 1)T + 1, . . . , kT , do.
(3.1) FU i selects an action pi,ji according to πti and sends
its relevant strategy information to the macrocell.
(3.2) All users measure their SINR γi with the feedback
information of the intended receiver. If γi ≥ γ∗i , then
ηi (p) can be achieved; otherwise, the receiver can not
receive correctly, thus obtains zero utility value.
(3.3) The MU calculates U0
(
p0,j0 ,pi
t
−0
)
according to Eq.
(13).
(3.4) The MBS broadcasts strategy information pit−1−0 to all
FUs.
(3.5) All FUs update b˜ti
(
p−(0,i)
)
basing on Eq. (23).
(3.6) All FUs update Q-values Qt+1i (pi,ji) according to Eq.
(24).
(3.7) All FUs update the strategies πt+1i (pi,ji) according to
Eq. (14).
(3.8) Set t = t+ 1.
4) The MU calculates Uk0 (p0,j0) according to Eq. (20).
5) The MU updates Q-values Qk+10 (p0,j0) according to Eq.
(19).
6) The MU updates the strategies πk+10 (p0,j0) according
to Eq. (14).
7) k = k + 1.
End Learning
It’s worth mentioning that during the learning process, every
FU utilizes the other FUs’ strategy information in previous
time slot. Unlike RLHPA-I, in algorithm RLHPA-II, the FUs
have multi-agent learning processes that relate to each other
and run simultaneously.
C. Theoretical Analysis of RLHPA-II
Next, we concentrate on analyzing the convergence property
of the RLHPA-II. The algorithm results in a stochastic process
of obtaining the vector of action selection probabilities, so
we need to characterize the long-term behaviors of all users.
Along with the discussion in Section IV-B, it only leaves
us to prove the convergence of FUs’ stochastic behavior in
each episode k, given that T is large enough. For an N -
FU stochastic learning game, we define the operator Hte as
follows.
Definition 3. Let Qte =
(
Qte1 , . . . , Q
te
N
)
, where Qtei ∈ Qi
for i ∈ N\{0}, and Q =
∏
i∈N\{0}Qi. H
te : Q → Q is a
mapping on the complete metric space Q into Q, HteQte =(
HteQte1 , . . . ,H
teQteN
)
, where
HteQtei (pi,ji) =∑
p
−(0,i)∈P−(0,i)
ui
(
p0,j0 , pi,ji , p−(0,i)
)
b˜tei
(
p−(0,i)
)
. (25)
Then we proceed to prove that Q∗ = E [HteQ∗].
Proposition 1. For an N -FU stochastic game,
Q∗ = E
[
HteQ∗
]
, (26)
where Q∗ = (Q∗1, . . . , Q∗N).
Proof: Since for ∀i ∈ N\{0}
Q∗i (pi,ji)
= E
[
ui
(
p0,j0 , pi,ji ,pi
∗
−(0,i)
)]
=
∑
p
−(0,i)∈P−(0,i)
ui
(
p0,j0 , pi,ji , p−(0,i)
) ∏
s∈N\{0,i}
π∗s (ps,js).
(27)
From the discussions in previous Section V-A, we have
b˜∗i
(
p−(0,i)
)
=
∏
s∈N\{0,i} π
∗
s (ps,js). Thus,
Q∗i (pi,ji) = E
[
HteQ∗i (pi,ji)
]
, (28)
for all pi,ji ∈ Pi. 
We further define the distance between any two Q-values.
Definition 4. For any Q,Q′ ∈ Q, we define∥∥Q−Q′∥∥ , max
i∈N\{0}
max
pi,ji∈Pi
∣∣Qi(pi,ji)−Q′i(pi,ji)∣∣. (29)
Proposition 2. Hte is a contraction mapping operator.
Proof: According to Definition 3, we have Eq. (30).
Next, we discuss the item
∑
p
−(0,i)∈P−(0,i)
[
b˜i
(
p−(0,i)
)
−
b˜′i
(
p−(0,i)
)]
ui
(
p0,j0 , pi,ji , p−(0,i)
)
in Eq. (30). Due to the fact
that the reference points are exogenously given and of common
knowledge, we may have Eq. (31).
8Qte+1i (pi,ji) =
(
1− αtef
)
Qtei (pi,ji) + α
te
f
∑
p
−(0,i)∈P−(0,i)
ui
(
p0,j0 , pi,ji , p−(0,i)
)
b˜tei
(
p−(0,i)
)
(24)
∥∥HteQ−HteQ′∥∥ = max
i∈N\{0}
max
pi,ji∈Pi
∣∣HteQi(pi,ji)−HteQ′i(pi,ji )∣∣
= max
i∈N\{0}
max
pi,ji∈Pi
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
p
−(0,i)∈P−(0,i)
[
b˜i
(
p−(0,i)
)
− b˜′i
(
p−(0,i)
)]
ui
(
p0,j0 , pi,ji , p−(0,i)
)∣∣∣∣∣∣ (30)
∑
p
−(0,i)∈P−(0,i)
[
b˜i
(
p−(0,i)
)
− b˜′i
(
p−(0,i)
)]
ui
(
p0,j0 , pi,ji , p−(0,i)
)
= −
∑
p
−(0,i)∈P−(0,i)
δi [πi(pi,ji)− π
′
i(pi,ji )]ui
(
p0,j0 , pi,ji , p−(0,i)
)
(31)
Now, we need to concentrate on the item πi(pi,ji ). By
applying Eq. (14), we have
πi (pi,ji) =
exp (Qi (pi,ji) /τi)∑
p∈Pi
exp (Qi(p)/τi)
. (32)
When τi is sufficiently large, we have
exp (Qi (pi,ji) /τi) = 1+
Qi (pi,ji)
τi
+ϕ
(
Qi (pi,ji)
τi
)
, (33)
where ϕ
(
Qi(pi,ji)/τi
)
is a polynomial of the order
O
(
(Qi(pi,ji)/τi)
2
)
. It’s then straightforward to derive∑
p∈Pi
exp (Qi(p)/τi) = mi +
∑
p∈Pi
[
Qi(p)
τi
+ ϕ
(
Qi(p)
τi
)]
.
(34)
It can be easily verified that
πi (pi,ji) =
1
mi
+
1
mi
·
Qi (pi,ji)
τi
+ ̺
({
Qi(p)
τi
}
p
)
, (35)
where ̺
(
{Qi(p)/τi}p
)
is a polynomial of order smaller than
O
(
{Qi(pi,ji )/τi}p
)
. Note that the coefficient of the polyno-
mial is independent of the Q-value. Similarly, we may obtain
π′i (pi,ji) =
1
mi
+
1
mi
·
Q′i (pi,ji)
τi
+ ̺
({
Q′i(p)
τi
}
p
)
. (36)
Substituting Eq. (35) and Eq. (36) to Eq. (31) establishes
Eq. (37). This means we can always take a sufficiently large
τi such that Eq. (38) is satisfied, where 0 < λi < mi. This
implies∥∥HteQ−HteQ′∥∥
≤ max
i∈N\{0}
max
pi,ji∈Pi
λi
mi
∣∣Qi (pi,ji)−Q′i (pi,ji) ∣∣
≤ ω
∥∥Q−Q′∥∥, (39)
where ω = maxi∈N\{0} λimi . It’s obvious that ω < 1.
Therefore, Hte is a contraction mapping operator. This
concludes the proof. 
We can now present the main result in this section that the
learning process induced by the RLHPA-II in each episode
converges.
Theorem 4. For each FU i ∈ N\{0}, regardless of any
initial value chosen for Q0i (pi,ji), if the temperature τi is
sufficiently large, the FUs’ stochastic behaviors converge.
Proof: The proof can be completed by directly applying
Lemma, which establishes the convergence given two condi-
tions. First, Hte is a contraction mapping operator, by Propo-
sition 2. Second, the fixed point condition, Q∗ = E[HteQ∗],
is ensured by Proposition 1. Therefore, the learning process
expressed by Eq. (24) converges. 
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We provide insight into the performance comparison of
the both learning algorithms through numerical simulations.
We consider a representative macrocell scenario where there
are two FUs coexisting with one MU over a spectrum with
bandwidth of 1MHz. The minimum SINR targets of MU and
FUs are assumed to be 3dB and 5dB, respectively. The noise of
the measurement is according to a zero-mean Gaussian noise
with the power of σ2 = −110dBm, and the additional circuit
power consumption is 10dBm for all users. The femtocells are
uniformly distributed within a circle area centered at the MBS
with radius of 500m. The coverage radius of femtocell is 20m.
The channel gains are generated by a log-normal shadowing
pathloss model, hi,j = d−ni,j , where di,j is the distance between
user i and BS j, and n is the pathloss exponent. In simulation,
n is assumed to be 4.
The action set of transmission power levels for all users is
{20, 25, 30}dBm. Each episode contains T = 100 time slots.
For simplicity, we suppose that the belief factors δi are all
equal to 2 in RLHPA-II, ∀i ∈ N\{0}, i.e., the FUs have the
same conjecture ability. Further, we use the following learning
rates for the MU and the FUs,
αkl =
α1l
θk
, αtef =
α1f
θte
, (40)
9∑
p
−(0,i)∈P−(0,i)
[
b˜i
(
p−(0,i)
)
− b˜′i
(
p−(0,i)
)]
ui
(
p0,j0 , pi,ji , p−(0,i)
)
= −
∑
p
−(0,i)∈P−(0,i)
δiui
(
p0,j0 , pi,ji , p−(0,i)
)
τi
·
1
mi
[Qi (pi,ji)−Q
′
i (pi,ji)] + ̺
({
Q′i(p)
τi
}
p
)
− ̺
({
Qi(p)
τi
}
p
)
(37)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
p
−(0,i)∈P−(0,i)
[
b˜i
(
p−(0,i)
)
− b˜′i
(
p−(0,i)
)]
ui
(
p0,j0 , pi,ji , p−(0,i)
)∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ λimi ∣∣Qi (pi,ji)−Q′i (pi,ji) ∣∣ (38)
where α1l , α1f ∈ [0, 1) are the initial learning rates, and θ > 1
is a scalar and is set to be 1.1 in our simulations.
The curves in Fig. 2, Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 show the learning
process of expected utilities for each user in the network. The
results are compared with
1) The fully cooperative power allocation game with com-
plete information exchange (Case I): each user knows
all the utility functions and transmission power levels of
other users in the network, and then the optimal utilities
in the power allocation process can be obtained by each
user according to Eq. (5) through exhausted searching.
This scenario is equivalent to the classic power control
game in femtocell networks without the pricing schemes
from macrocells as shown in [6].
2) The non-cooperative learning process of the power con-
trol game without any private information exchange
(Case II): each user’s transmission decisions in the
learning process are self-incentive with myopic best
response correspondence, which is the similar scenario
discussed in [17].
The first observation from our simulation results is that,
whenever we generate random initial probability distributions
of the power levels, the equilibrium state of the transmission
strategies achieved by all users is independent of these initial
values. That is, there exists an SE in the Stackelberg learning
game, which confirms Theorem 2.
Secondly, we can find from the curves that the expected
utilities of all users in the learning process will finally converge
(or approach) to the equilibrium point in the complete coopera-
tion case, and these simulation results validate the conclusions
of Theorem 3 and Theorem 4. In addition, the proposed
reinforcement learning based schemes both outperform the
non-cooperative case, which is because for a Stackelberg learn-
ing game, knowing more can improve not only the leader’s
(MU) own utility, but also the utilities of the followers (FUs).
Meanwhile, the RLHPA-II can achieve better performance than
RLHPA-I, which is due to the fact that all FUs have the
incentive to achieve better utilities thus behave reciprocally
by exchanging transmission parameters in the previous time
slot (indicated by Eq. (23)).
Fig. 5 shows the expected SINRs of FUs using RLHPA-I
and RLHPA-II, respectively, versus the macrocell’s minimum
QoS requirement γ∗0 . As expected, a higher γ∗0 results in higher
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interference caused by the MU to the FUs, i.e., the achieved
performances are degraded. Further, it can be observed that
for the same γ∗0 , the expected SINRs of the FUs with RLHPA-
II is in general higher than that with RLHPA-I. This is in
accordance with our previous discussions. It is also worth
mentioning that when γ∗0 is sufficiently large, the expected
SINRs of the FUs approach to zero for the two learning
algorithms. This is because when γ∗0 is sufficiently large, there
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is no femtocell active in the networks.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, energy efficiency is investigated for the
uplink transmission in a spectrum-sharing-based two-tier fem-
tocell network using stochastic learning theory combined with
Stackelberg games. The Stackelberg learning framework is
adopted to jointly study the utility maximization of the MU
and FUs. Based on reinforcement learning, we propose two
intelligent algorithms, namely, RLHPA-I and RLHPA-II, whose
convergence properties have also been proven theoretically.
Numerical experiments illustrate that the reciprocity-inspired
RLHPA-II converges more quickly and achieves better utility
performance compared to RLHPA-I and the non-cooperative
learning scheme. This comes at the expense of obtaining
more side strategy information at the FUs. Concludingly, both
learning algorithms show the potential in improving the energy
efficiency in the greener femtocell networks.
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